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This paper assesses the development of the modeling of group behavior in 
the interest group literature. Throughout the literature, interest groups have 
been modeled in multiple ways: from passive groups that do not interact 
with one another to groups that act just as rational strategic players. 
Although there has been considerable progress and models are 
increasingly more realistic and successful at explaining political outcomes, 
we still have a long way to go. In this paper, I propose that the 
introduction of group formation into our models is the best way of 
continuing with research. 
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1. Introduction 
  Interest groups are a prevalent and important characteristic of our modern political 
systems. Contributing to political parties, endorsing candidates, and informing the public, are just 
a few of the important roles performed by interest groups. Hence, it is not surprising that the 
influence of these organized sectors of society is easily observed in the everyday activities of all 
branches of governments. A simple glimpse of trade agreements or tax codes is more than 
enough to see that some groups receive preferential treatments while others do not. It is 
practically impossible to explain the existence of many policies, such as farm subsidies in the 
“first world”, without incorporating interest groups into the analysis. Even in the economic 
development literature, some authors consider an organized civil society represented by 
numerous interest groups, as not only desirable, but also essential for the development of 
countries. It enables citizens to better monitor and hold their government accountable, 
contributing to more transparent market practices, efficient governments, and social equity (Sen, 
1999; Edwards, 1999). For these reasons, economists have started to pay more attention to 
interest groups and their role in determining policy outcomes. Although, research in this area has 
grown considerably, there are still many unanswered questions. 
Naturally, as we improve our understanding of interest groups, we change the roles and 
behavior these groups have in our models. The aim of this paper is to review how group 
modeling has evolved with time, and to argue that the most important feature that is yet not 
understood is how interest groups come into being. Firstly, I give an overview of the theoretical 
models that have been developed so far. I emphasize how distinct approaches have given interest 
groups different roles and characteristics, each approach having its advantages but also its 
limitations. Secondly, I consider what are the main areas for improvement and then I concentrate 
on group formation as the most vital feature to be researched. Conclusions are provided at the 
end. 
 
2. The modeling of interest groups 
The literature that studies interest groups has been growing considerably for the past two 
decades. There are numerous papers that take a look at the role and behavior of interest groups in 
the political sphere. These include a wide variety of models, from rent-seeking or information   2
transmission lobbying to analyzing the possible effects of different institutional settings or voting 
rules. Here I do not attempt to give an exhaustive treatment of all these different approaches. 
Instead, I take a general look at how interest groups have been modeled and what role they have 
been assigned. For the interested readers, more extensive surveys of the interest groups literature 
are available; see for example Austen-Smith (1997), van Winden (1999), or Grossman and 
Helpman (2001). 
  The literature can be divided into four main categories in which interest groups play 
markedly different roles. These are: (i) groups as a way of categorizing individuals; (ii) groups 
that enforce norms; (iii) groups with direct influence on policymakers, and (iv) groups that 
transmit information.  
2.1 Groups as a way of categorizing individuals 
These models assume that groups are not organized, and therefore, they do not interact 
either with other groups or with policymakers. The group is simply a way of identifying or 
differentiating individual agents. 
In general, there are two political parties that compete to win an election; after which, the 
winner implements a promised unidimensional policy outcome π ∈ [π
L, π
H]. It is assumed that 
political parties care only about winning and do not care what the policy outcome turns out to be. 
In other words, the competing parties will choose π in order to maximize only their probability 
of winning. There is a population of N voters and each individual voter i ∈ {1, …, N} has a 
preferred or ideal policy outcome πi ∈ [π
L, π
H]. Voter i’s utility is given by a utility function of 
the form Ui(π, πi, αi)
1, where αi is an unobserved exogenous factor not related to the policy 
outcome (αi can be taken to represent features such as party partisanship, private income, quality 
of the candidates, etc.). Each individual will vote for the party that gives her the highest utility. 
At this point, groups are introduced by assumption. A total of G groups are assumed to 
exist and each individual is a member of exactly one group. The members of a group are 
characterized by having the same preferences for policy; in other words, they all have equal ideal 
policy outcomes πi. Note however that within a group there can be different values of αi.  
                                                 
1 It is common to assume a utility function of the form: Ui = –(π – πi)
2 + αi   3
Diverse approaches within this framework have provided important insights regarding the 
effects of group size and/or composition on the welfare of its members. Dixit and Londregan 
(1996) analyze precisely these two effects. In their model, they introduce the following 
exogenous factors: party partisanship —that is, a preference for one of the parties irrespective of 
the policy outcome — and private income. As policy outcomes, parties choose redistribution 
schedules that transfer income from some groups to others. They find that if both parties have the 
same ability to redistribute income between groups, then the resulting equilibrium is the median 
voter outcome. This entails that, groups with less partisan members as well as groups whose 
members have lower incomes are better off. The reason behind the result is that the utility of 
voters with less partisanship or low income is affected more by policy choice. Consequently, 
their votes are easier to buy. With respect to group size, they find that it has not effect on the 
equilibrium outcome. 
Another interesting approach within this framework is proposed by Lohmann (1998). She 
introduces information asymmetries between voters such that, although the policy outcome 
cannot be observed directly, there are informed voters that observe a better signal of the outcome 
than other less informed voters. As a result, the parties have an incentive to move policy in the 
direction of the groups that are better informed. This is because, informed voters are more likely 
to notice and react to a policy changes than uninformed voters. Lohmann goes even further and 
makes the information asymmetry endogenous by allowing voters to decide, at a cost, if the want 
to get informed or not. It turns out, that individuals in large groups get less informed since they 
face a more serious free-rider problem. To be more specific, political parties tend to give more 
importance to large groups since they represent a large number of votes. Hence, since policy is 
already biased in their direction, individuals in large groups have a smaller incentive to acquire 
information
2. As a result, smaller better-informed groups have more influence over policy than 
mere numbers would suggest. 
Although, this type of analysis provides significant insights, it has serious limitations. 
Specifically, it ignores the fact that groups can be organized and act to further their own interests. 
Policymakers have an incentive to categorize individuals into groups. At the very least, it reduces 
the administrative costs of targeting policy to voters. A clear example of this categorization is tax 
                                                 
2 This result relies on the following assumptions: marginal utility losses become bigger as policy deviates 
from the individual’s ideal point, and information acquisition presents nondecreasing marginal costs.   4
policy. To raise a fixed amount of tax revenue at a minimal political cost
3, the government 
should use a different tax rate for each of the taxable activities performed by each of the 
taxpayers. However, the administrative costs of doing this would far outweigh the tax revenues. 
Thus, governments sort people into groups depending on some easily observable characteristic 
and tax each group at different rates (Hettich and Winer, 1999). Nonetheless, it is a serious 
limitation to ignore the possibility that once these groups are formed, they can find a way to 
organize themselves and lobby the government for special tax treatment (Schram and van 
Winden, 1991). To summarize, giving groups no capacity to act as a group is an extreme 
simplification that is unsupported by what we observe in everyday politics.  
2.2 Groups that enforce norms 
  Another approach to understand the effects of groups is to analyze what role a group 
plays in affecting the behavior of its members. It is widely acknowledged (at least outside the 
field of economics) that the way we act is affected by the people with whom we have contact. 
Social norms such as fairness and cooperation are constantly being followed and enforced during 
social interaction. In politics, social interaction plays an important role, and thus, the groups in 
which this interaction takes place become crucial to our understanding of political behavior. 
Behavior that makes no sense at the individual level might make sense at the group level. 
  In many cases, politically active groups such as church organizations and unions have 
substantive influence on the behavior of its members. Norm enforcement through social approval 
or disapproval is especially effective since the other group members are the same people with 
whom social interaction occurs. In fact, if it were not for strong norm enforcement, free riding 
could be prevalent and these types of groups might not exist at all. 
  In the interest group literature, this approach has been used to explain voter turnout in 
large-scale elections. As it is well understood, in such cases voter turnout cannot be explained if 
one considers voters as rational agents and there is a cost to voting. A voter will only vote if her 
vote may be pivotal and can change the election’s outcome. Since electorates are constituted of a 
large number of voters, the probability that any one voter will be pivotal is extremely low. Thus, 
only very small turnouts are predicted. However, even though for one voter this probability may 
                                                 
3 Taxing has a political cost since it causes discontent among the taxed individuals, and consequently, a 
reduction of the incumbent’s probability of reelection.   5
be very small, for a group of voters who coordinate their actions, the probability of changing an 
election’s outcome might grow significantly. In essence, groups reduce the size of the electorate 
and thus can help explain voter turnout. 
  Using this line of reasoning, Uhlaner (1989) discusses how this might happen. It is 
assumed that each voter is a member of one group and that the group leader has the ability to 
punish group members that do no vote. More formally, each member i of group g will go to vote 
if the utility of voting is higher than that of abstaining: Ug(πg, –(P
0
i +  Ci) > Ug(πg, –(Pi +  C
0
i)); 
where P are the punishments that can be imposed by the group leader and C are the costs of 
voting
4. The political parties will shift policy towards the group’s ideal depending on the 
increase in the probability of winning that a change in turnout brings. Assuming that group 
leaders attempt to maximize the group’s total welfare, they will induce group turnout up to the 
point where the marginal increase in welfare due to a change in policy (multiplied by the 
probability that the group’s candidate will win) equals the marginal cost of forcing members to 
vote. Morton (1991) takes the analysis one step further by having group leaders take into account 
the effect that other groups might have on turnout. Overall, this approach is more successful 
explaining why people vote. It has even been used empirically to explain changes in voter 
turnout in the United States (Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999). Nonetheless, it still has the caveat that 
if candidates were allowed to change their policies, then the median voter outcome would arise. 
In such a case, both candidates choose the same policy outcome; voters are thus indifferent 
between the two, and turnout drops to zero. Furthermore and perhaps more importantly, for large 
enough elections the groups have to be of considerable size to sufficiently affect the probability 
of one candidate winning. A leader of such a large group would face considerable difficulties 
observing individual actions and punishing specific members if they decide not to vote. 
  In my opinion, this approach promises to shed light on many political settings and should 
be applied to other forms of behavior. We will never come to decipher the mechanisms by which 
interest groups affect policy if we do not understand how groups are able to coordinate their 
actions. However, the mechanism used by group leaders to induce a certain kind of behavior has 
to be more explicitly modeled and not just assumed. Otherwise, such models might miss 
significant effects.  
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0 and C
0 would be the punishment for voting and the cost of abstaining respectively. Note that for the 
group member to vote it must be true that: P – P
0 > C – C
0.   6
2.3 Groups with direct influence on policymakers 
  This branch of the literature concentrates on the impact that interest groups and the 
policymaker have on each other actions. Most of the models that fall under this category 
concentrate on the strategic interaction between and among both interest groups and 
policymakers. To the best of my knowledge, it is normally assumed that interest groups exist and 
that each interest group acts as an individual agent. In other words, group formation and the 
interaction between individuals within the group is ignored for simplicity. 
  For the most part, the models focus on how policy changes when interest groups are 
introduced and allowed to lobby. This type of approach usually assumes that interest groups have 
the ability to directly affect the policymaker’s utility. Thus, the final policy outcome is ultimately 
determined by the effect of the combined actions of the interest groups on the behavior of the 
policymaker. 
The first models within this framework use an influence function to embody the 
interaction between the policymaker and the interest groups. This in fact eliminates the 
policymaker from the model and simply assumes that the interest groups are somehow able to 
jointly decide what is the final policy outcome. An interest group g is maximizing its utility 
given the actions of other interest groups: formally, it maximizes the function Ug(π, πg, yg) where 
π = I(y, α). In this case, yg represents the resources spent by interest group g and y the vector of 
resources spent by all interest groups. The equilibrium is determined using non-cooperative 
game theory, by which, each interest group has an optimal reply function to the actions of the 
other groups. The resulting Nash equilibrium gives us the value of the optimal policy outcome  
π
* = I(y
*, α). In the resulting equilibrium, there is some wasteful spending by interest groups 
since they are forced to compete for influence in a prisoner’s dilemma type of situation. 
However, as Becker (1983) illustrates, the resources spent competing might not be entirely 
wasteful. To argue his point, Becker develops a model in which interest groups compete for rents 
by lobbying the government to either lower taxes or increase subsidies. He incorporates 
deadweight losses in the analysis so that some income is lost during tax collection or revenue 
distribution. Since the interest groups are interested in acquiring as much rent as they can with 
the least possible expenditures, they would favor taxes or subsidies that have low deadweight 
losses. Therefore, the advantage of competition among interest groups is that it favors efficient 
methods of taxation. Becker also finds that small interest groups are better at extracting rents   7
since they suffer less from the free-rider problem — a finding that seems to be supported 
empirically. For extensions of Becker’s model and further discussion, see Cairns (1989) or 
Edelman (1992). 
Another way of analyzing this kind of setting is with the use of common agency theory 
(Grossman and Helpman, 1994). One can think of the principals as being the interest groups and 
the agent as being the policymaker. Interest groups pay the policymaker via campaign 
contributions to try to shape policy in their favor. In this case, the interest groups present to the 
policymaker contribution schedules that depend on the final policy outcome. This approach has 
been used to explain the government’s choice of trade policy (Grossman and Helpman, 1994) as 
well as consumer and producer taxes and subsidies (Dixit, Grossman and Helpman, 1997). In 
both cases, the authors find that in equilibrium the policymaker will maximize a composite 
utility function in which interest groups will be able to extract some rents from the policymaker. 
Nevertheless, this result depends on the existence of deadweight losses to income redistribution 
between groups. If there are no deadweight losses, such as when lump-sum transfers are allowed, 
then the competition among interest groups drives their possible political rents to zero. 
  The influence function and the common agency approach both help explain interest group 
behavior. However, they both have some setbacks. The main setback of the influence function 
approach is that the mechanism by which the interest group affects policy is not explicitly 
modeled. The predicted equilibrium depends on the shape of the influence function but the 
models do not provide an explanation of why a certain shape is chosen. The common agency 
approach improves our understating by explicitly modeling how interest groups affect policy, 
namely through contributions. Nevertheless, as we will see later, we still do not have a clear 
explanation of why would political parties accept large amounts of contributions, and more 
puzzling, why would the unorganized electorate vote such politicians into power. 
  A logical next step within this framework is to allow interest groups to use different ways 
of influencing the policymaker. This could yield insights as to why different interest groups 
appear to compete for influence in markedly different ways (for example contributing to political 
campaigns vs. using the threat of a strike). A step in this direction was taken by Sloof and van 
Winden (2000). They build a model in which an interest group has the choice of using either 
lobbying or pressure to influence the policymaker. Interestingly, they find that lobbying cannot   8
fully substitute pressure since it cannot be used to build the necessary reputation that makes 
threats credible.  
2.4 Groups that transmit information 
  The part of the literature that falls under this category has concentrated on the influence 
interest groups have by affecting the policymaker’s actions through information transmission. 
Although direct influence through campaign contributions, bribes, family ties, etc. is certainly 
important, it is obvious that it is not the only activity performed by interest groups (van Winden, 
1999). The transmission of information from informed interest groups to uninformed 
policymakers might be equally or even more important in determining policy outcomes. In 
general, this literature focuses on the conditions under which truthful transmission of information 
can occur and the characteristics of the resulting policy outcome. As in the previous category, 
interest groups are assumed to exist and behave as individuals would. 
  Information asymmetries are introduced by assuming that interest groups are perfectly 
informed, or at least more informed, than the policymaker. More specifically, the policymaker is 
assumed to have an ideal policy outcome πp ∈ [π
L, π
H], and deviations from this point cause her 
disutility. Therefore, the policymaker maximizes her utility if she chooses π = πp. However, 
when deciding the value of the π, she does not know what is the value of πp
5. The policymaker 
takes πp as a random variable distributed on the interval [π
L, π
H] according to some distribution 
function. In the absence of additional information, the policymaker implements the policy that 
maximizes her utility given her expectation of πp. In other words, π = E[πp]. Lastly, as 
mentioned above, it is assumed that interest groups do know, or at least have additional 
information on the true value of πp. The most basic of these games are now known as “cheap 
talk” games (the term is used since the interest group cannot influence the policymaker directly, 
but it may convince the latter by offering costless information, i.e. talking). Successful 
information transmission will depend on the position of the interest group’s ideal policy outcome 
relative to the policymaker’s. Crawford and Sobel (1982) analyze this model when there is only 
one interest group to inform the policymaker. They find that information transmission is more 
                                                 
5 The policymaker’s ideal policy outcome πp can be interpreted to mean the possible states of the world.   9
likely to play an important role the closer is πg (the ideal point of the interest group)
 6 to πp. 
However, not all information is transmitted; the misalignment of preferences between the interest 
group and the policymaker prevents the interest group from revealing the precise value of πp. 




p(πg)]  in which πp is located. Furthermore, 
for different enough values of πg and πp, no communication at all will exist. The effect on the 
final policy outcome is that it moves slightly in the direction of πg.  
There are several extensions to Crawford and Sobel’s analysis. For example, Krishna and 
Morgan (2001) introduce a second interest group and find that truthful revelation of πp is 
possible when the policymaker can consult interest groups with opposing preferences
7. Banerjee 
and Somanathan (2001) go further and extend the analysis to G interest groups. They find that in 
this case communication becomes even more difficult and might break down completely if the 
values of πg vary a lot between interest groups. Finally, Battaglini (2002) extends the model to a 
case in which policy is multidimensional. He finds that, unlike unidimensional theories, the 
determinant factor in information transmission is not the distance between the ideal points but 
the shape of the indifference curves of the interest groups at πp. For further discussion on cheap 
talk games see Farrell and Rabin (1996). 
  It is not very realistic to assume that, in politics, transmitting information to policymakers 
is costless. In fact lobbying costs can be considerable
8. For this reason, models in which there is 
a cost to communication have been developed. For example, Potters and van Winden (1992) 
present a model where one informed interest group interacts with an uninformed policymaker. 
They find that introducing costs might help communication since it provides the interest group 
with a tool to add credibility to its statement of the value of πp. More specifically, in some cases, 
depending on the cost of lobbying, the benefits from lying to the policymaker will be less than 
                                                 
6 The group’s ideal policy outcome πg is defined relative to πp. In other words, πg is also dependent on the 
state of the world. The simplest and most common definition of πg is: πg = πp + δ, where δ indicates how 
aligned are the preferences of the interest group and the policymaker. 
7 Opposing preferences means that: πg1 > πp > πg2. 
8 Furthermore, even in the case where there are costless ways of transmitting information, an interest 
group can easily choose to “create” costs by transmitting information using other more costly channels 
(Austen-Smith and Banks, 2000).   10
the cost of lobbying and thus the interest group does not lobby. However, the fact that the 
interest group is not lobbying gives the policymaker additional information about the value of πp. 
As it turns out, groups with more aligned preferences with the policymaker will tend to lobby 
while groups with more divergent preferences will tend to not communicate. Costs, in a way, 
serve as a signal to the policymaker. In fact, if the interest group is able to vary its costs, it would 
then be able to signal precisely what is the value πp by producing a cost schedule (i.e. a different 
cost for each realization of πp) constructed in such a way to make lying about πp unprofitable. 
However, this conclusion breaks down if the interest group has to decide on the cost schedule 
before learning the realization of πp (referred to as buying access). In this case, again, only the 
interest groups with preferences similar to the policymaker will pay to transmit information (see 
Austen-Smith, 1995). Similar approaches have also been used to explain slightly different 
situations but all arriving to comparable results. For example, see Lohmann (1993) and Lohmann 
(1995) for models of mass political demonstrations. 
  The information approach to interest group modeling has come a long way, but there are 
still aspects that could be considerably improved. Most of the information literature has 
concentrated on the information transmission between the interest group and the policymaker. It 
has neglected to look into the information flow among and within the interest groups (i.e. the 
interest group leadership and its members). Grossman and Helpman (2001) took a step in this 
direction
9. They take the same cheap talk framework and use it to model a situation in which the 
individuals and not the policymaker are uninformed of their optimal policy outcomes. The 
interest group leaders, who are completely informed, might face problems transmitting 
information if there are exogenous factors that differ among group members. More formally, the 
utility of an individual i, member of group g, is given by Ug(π, πg, αi) and αi is not the same in 
the entire group. Their conclusions are very much the same as in the cheap talk literature 
described above. Although Grossman and Helpman try to capture an important phenomenon — 
namely, the role interest groups play in shaping the opinion of its members and the public in 
general — their model is much too simple to capture the complexity of information transmission 
within groups. When referring to groups, the question of how information is transmitted is much 
                                                 
9 Similar approaches include the work on the strategic use of endorsements by Cameron and Jung (1995) 
and Grossman and Helpman (1999).   11
more relevant. Differing network structures among groups, group size, and the channels that are 
used for communication might have important consequences on how the group behaves and how 
individuals perceive that behavior.  
2.5 Additional extensions 
  By and large, interest groups have been modeled in these basic four ways. Certainly, 
there are numerous models that provide us with important extensions. However, the roles 
assigned to interest groups in these models could still be considered as belonging to one of the 
four categories already described. To mention briefly these branches of the literature, they 
consist of three main extensions. Firstly, the modeling of the policymaker’s ideal policy choice 
πp. These models explain the black box of how the policymaker’s preferences over policies are 
obtained. They include models where the policymaker cares about votes and the interest group 
can influence voters, usually through campaign spending (Austen Smith, 1987; Baron, 1994; 
Prat, 2002; Potters, Sloff and van Winden 1997), and models where the policymaker maximizes 
a weighted welfare function in which the weights are endogenously determined and can be given 
different interpretations (Grossman and Helpman, 1996). Secondly, models in which the number 
and characteristics of the political candidates are determined endogenously. In these so-called 
citizen-candidate models, all voters have the option of becoming a candidate and running for 
office. The effects of interest group lobbying can be completely neutralized if the right candidate 
is selected (Besley, 2001), but only if the candidate cannot deny access to some of the interest 
groups (Felli and Merlo, 2001). Lastly, there are quite a few papers that have enriched the 
modeling of the government’s institutional setting. These include, models that substitute the 
policymaker by a more complex decision-making institution, such as a legislature (Baron and 
Ferejohn, 1989; Snyder, 1991; Groseclose and Snyder, 1996; Helpman and Persson, 2001), 
courts (Epstein, 1991) or a combination of bureaucrats and elected officials (Spiller, 1990; 
Laffont and Tirole, 1991; Banks and Weingast, 1992; Mazza and van Winden, 2002).  
 
3. Further research 
Overall, the interest group literature has come a long way. There is now a much better 
picture of how politics and economics are influenced by interest groups. Our growing 
understanding in this area has allowed us to explain many political outcomes, and additionally, it   12
has highlighted phenomena that have constantly eluded our comprehension. As we will see later, 
even though there has been considerable progress, there remains a basic factor that has been 
consistently ignored and assumed away — namely, the way interest groups form. This section is 
divided into two parts. In the first part, I explain what are the most restrictive assumptions in our 
current models. In the second part, I focus on group formation. I initially give a brief explanation 
of the difficulty of modeling collective action, and then, I provide an overview of the models that 
have attempted to analyze the effects of group formation.  
3.1 What are we assuming? 
Throughout the interest group literature, strong assumptions are used for simplifying 
purposes. However, assumptions that are too strong and restrictive can easily lead us to draw 
incorrect conclusions. Hence, it is important for these assumptions to be reevaluated once the 
underling structure of the studied phenomena is understood. In the interest group literature, 
various approaches could lead to filling the existing holes in our knowledge. More specifically, 
weakening one or more of the following assumptions would provide richer and more accurate 
results. 
Assumption 1: A single policymaker determines the policy outcome. 
Although this is a useful representation of how policy is produced, it ignores the much more 
complex nature of governments. More research could yield insights of how bureaucrats, 
legislators, elected officials, judges, etc. interact with one another to yield policy outcomes (van 
Winden, 1999). 
Assumption 2: Interest groups can simply use money to influence policy. 
Although empirically proven (Snyder, 1990; 1993), the mechanism by which interest groups 
transform money into policy is not yet clear
10. Direct payouts to policymakers are possible but it 
is hard to believe they account for most of the observed influence. After all, since there are no 
legally binding contracts for such transactions, the interest group has no guarantee that the 
policymaker will implement the policy once she receives the money. Another possibility is that 
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voluntary work can be used too (Denzau and Munger, 1986; Hall and Wayman, 1990).   13
money buys votes, but yet again, it has not been satisfactorily explained how that occurs 
(Austen-Smith, 1997).  
Assumption 3: Agents are rational expected utility maximizers. 
The rationality assumption is being revisited in practically in all fields in economics. An 
overwhelming amount of evidence shows that individuals deviate from rational behavior in 
significant and non-negligible ways (Rabin, 1998). Therefore, this assumption may be 
questioned in the interest group literature as well. To give a few examples, one would think that: 
cognitive limitations might play a role when individuals try to calculate the complex 
relationships that determine the consequences of a proposed policy; social norms, such as 
fairness, which are so prominent in political discourse would also affect political behavior; and 
finally, emotions, so very common in politics, may also play a central role (van Winden, 1999).  
Assumption 4: Interest groups behave as unitary actors. 
The process by which groups make decisions is still not understood. Assuming a group behaves 
as an individual, although very useful, has neither theoretical nor empirical backing. It has been 
proven that thinking of groups as simply having an aggregate utility function and maximizing it 
like an individual, holds only under very restrictive conditions (Arrow, 1963). Furthermore, 
experimental evidence provides a mixed picture regarding group behavior vis-à-vis individual 
behavior. Sometimes groups do take the same decisions as individuals (Bone, Hey, and Suckling, 
1999), but also, they can act differently. In some experiments, groups come closer than 
individuals to the predictions of traditional rational theory (Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998), but 
puzzlingly, in other cases they are further away (Cox and Hayne, 2002). The accurate modeling 
of economic behavior requires us to understand under what conditions and in what ways do 
groups and individuals behave differently. Interest groups are much more heterogeneous than 
other economic agents such as firms, and therefore this assumption might be even more 
problematic in the political setting. 
Assumption 5: Interest groups are better informed. 
It is commonly assumed that interest groups are more informed than either the policymaker or 
the voters. This assumption is usually justified saying that interest groups either are experts 
acquiring information or simply aggregate the information given to them by individual members.   14
If it is a matter of expertise, it is not very plausible that there are not enough qualified experts for 
the government to select one with whom it shares similar preferences over policy. More 
realistically, if the interest group has more information because it acquires it from its members, 
then the way information is obtained might be especially important. Network structures for 
information transmission are bound to have a vital role. To sum up, a more satisfactory 
explanation of how information is acquired by interest groups should be put forward. 
Assumption 6: Interest groups already exist. 
Perhaps the most important limitation of these models is that it is simply assumed that interest 
groups exist. As mentioned previously, for this reason group formation is treated extensively in 
the second part of this section.  
3.2 Interest group formation 
Even though researchers of interest group behavior could concentrate on various issues to 
continue with their work, group formation is among the most important questions to be 
addressed. After all, we are trying to explain a phenomenon — namely, the effect of interest 
groups on policy and economic outcomes — without understanding how that phenomenon 
comes about. We need to understand how and why people organize into groups and act 
collectively. The incentives to do so are very clear, but the mechanism by which this is 
accomplished is still shrouded in mystery. 
The main difficulty of modeling interest group formation is overcoming the free-rider 
problem of collective action. The problem was brought to the fore by Olson (1965) when he 
proved that even under very relaxed conditions, rational agents will not engage in collective 
action, even when there are considerable benefits from doing so. Olson’s argument centers on the 
assumption that the group in question is big enough so that individual actions have a negligible 
effect on the provision of the collective good. If this is the case, every single agent decides to 
free ride on the efforts of the other group members and the collective good is not produced. The 
collective good received from forming an interest group has in many cases this characteristic. 
Perhaps, the reluctance to model interest group formation is rooted in the lack of 
consensus as to how the problem of collective action is resolved. Many different theories and 
techniques have been put forward in the attempt to solve it. Some examples include: altruistic 
agents (Bergstrom, Blume and Varian, 1986), reciprocal behavior (Carpenter, Matthews and   15
Ong'ong'a, 2002; Rabin, 1993), reputation in repeated interaction (Kreps, et al. 1982), and 
learning (Ostrom, 2000). Still, even though there is mounting experimental evidence that has 
helped us identify under what conditions is collective action more likely, a theory that 
satisfactorily explains all the empirical results does not yet exist (van Winden, 2002). 
Nevertheless, even though we lack a theory that can satisfactorily account for collective 
behavior, incorporating some of the proposed explanations into interest group models might 
yield fruitful results. There is always the risk that a model is based on a theory that later turns out 
to be incorrect. However, it is a risk worth taking. The conclusions drawn from models that 
incorporate collective action might not only provide new insights on interest group behavior, but 
they would also provide us with more predictions, which can then be used to empirically test the 
contesting theories. 
Not modeling group formation would leave a big gap in our understanding and many 
important questions unanswered. More insights are needed to answer basic questions such as: 
Why are some sectors of society represented by interest groups and others are not? Does the 
threat of currently unorganized groups that can suddenly organize affect behavior? How did 
nonexistent movements, such as the currently strong environmentalist lobby, form? Why are 
there interest groups that concentrate only on one or two issues while others cover a wide variety 
of interests? What are the incentives needed to promote the formation or dissolution of interest 
groups? etc. Without such knowledge, our models will be limited to explaining short term, static 
situations in which interest groups neither form nor expire. 
There are a few models that have started to answer some of these questions. For example, 
Mitra (1999) presents a model in which the number of interest groups is determined 
endogenously. Mitra’s model is based on the common agency model of Grossman and Helpman 
(1994), in which the existence of a fixed number of groups is assumed. Ingeniously, Mitra 
extends the model by noting that groups face two kinds of costs; the group has to pay for the 
contributions given to the policymaker along with an initial fixed cost associated with the 
organization of the lobby. If the group remains unorganized, it does not incur in any of these 
expenses. However, remaining unorganized has its costs too — namely, utility lost because 
organized groups can extract rents from unorganized groups by making contributions to the 
policymaker. Within this framework, a group’s optimal behavior is to organize and lobby the 
policymaker if the costs of doing so are lower than the costs of remaining unorganized. Mitra   16
proves that, as the number of organized groups increase, the benefit of being an organized group 
decreases
11. The reason behind this result is that, as the number of organized groups increase, 
there are more lobbies working against each other and a smaller unorganized population to 
exploit. Given this fact, a unique equilibrium can be determined at the point where the benefits of 
forming an additional interest group are equal to zero. As one can expect, Mitra’s model 
provides us with new insights. For example: increases in inequality increase both the number of 
lobbies and the rents of lobbying; if fixed costs are equal across groups then in equilibrium 
lobbies do not extract rents from the unorganized groups
12; free trade occurs either when all the 
population is organized or when nobody is organized, and lastly, if the policymaker’s affinity for 
contributions increases, then unorganized groups are worse off than in the case where the 
number of lobbies is exogenous. A similar approach is used by Damania and Fredriksson (2000) 
and Damania, Fredriksson and Osang (2002). They model endogenous lobby formation in 
imperfectly competitive industries. They find that, if firms within an industry are able to achieve 
high levels of collusion in the output market, it becomes easier to cooperate in order to form an 
industry-wide lobby group. 
The next step within this approach would be to improve the modeling of the collective 
action problem. These models do not use a satisfactory mechanism to overcome the free-rider 
problem implicit in group formation. For example, Mitra (1999) assumes that individuals are 
able to coordinate their actions in such a way that if any agent decides to free ride then no lobby 
is formed. Since an individual cannot benefit from the lobby if she does not contribute, there is 
no free-rider problem
13. Mitra (1999) acknowledges that, because of various reasons, some 
groups face more difficulties than others to act collectively. However, these reasons are reduced 
to different fixed costs across groups. Modeling more explicitly how these fixed costs are 
determined would provide a more complete analysis. In Damania and Fredriksson (2000) and 
                                                 
11 The benefit of being an organized group always decreases as long as we assume that groups with lower 
fixed costs organize before groups with higher fixed costs do. 
12 This result depends on the assumption that the policymaker redistributes its revenue uniformly and 
costlessly among all the individuals. 
13 The problem is just a matter of coordinating actions. Instead of a situation analogous to the prisoner’s 
dilemma game, we have a situation analogous to the assurance game where pre-play communication can 
easily guarantee a cooperative outcome.   17
Damania, Fredriksson and Osang (2002), the free-rider problem is not assumed away. It is 
overcome by assuming infinite repetitions of the game and a grim-trigger strategy. In such a 
situation, the threat of ending cooperation forever keeps individuals from free riding. In my 
opinion, although it is a valid mathematical solution to the collective action problem, it does not 
reflect what really drives collective behavior. There is clear experimental evidence that 
demonstrates how individuals cooperate in finitely repeated games and even in the final period 
(Douglas and Holt, 1993). This indicates that people cooperate for other reasons and not only 
because of a sufficiently high discount factor is used to discount future utility. We should try to 
identify these reasons to incorporate them into future models. 
As we have seen, introducing group formation into the analysis can change some of the 
conclusions and mechanisms that have already been found. In the worst case, continuing with 
research and ignoring group formation might make new findings irrelevant once it is finally 
incorporated. On a more positive note, investigating such a crucial issue will possibly lead to 
important insights into other aspects and facilitate their understanding.  
 
4. Conclusions 
In this era of democratic governments, the interaction of interest groups and 
policymakers is an influential every-day phenomenon that affects both political and economic 
affairs. As was illustrated in this paper, this interaction and the effects that interest groups have 
on politics have been extensively studied. Nevertheless, we are still far from having a coherent 
picture of what is the role of these groups and through what means do they shape policy. 
Weakening some of the most restrictive assumptions would lead us to a better understanding and 
perhaps to finding the answers to important questions. 
One such question is: What are the welfare effects of lobbying? So far, we have not been 
able to assess what are the welfare effects of lobbying. If one concentrates on the rent-seeking 
activities interest groups perform, one would be inclined to think that lobbying leads to wasteful 
spending as interest groups compete for special treatment (Tullock, 1980); and that is in addition 
to the welfare losses incurred as policy might shift from its optimum. If this were the case, 
lobbying should be banned or at least discouraged. However, as Becker (1983) illustrated, not 
everything is so bleak; this competition might have some benefits, such as more efficient   18
taxation. Furthermore, rent seeking is not the only activity performed by interest groups. 
Information transmission promises to be a welfare-enhancing role carried out by interest groups. 
However, even in the information-transmission literature, it is not clear what are the net welfare 
effects of interest group lobbying. As pointed out by Potters and van Winden (1992), if there are 
costs to lobbying, the net welfare effect might be negative. A clearer picture in these matters 
might allow us to design our political institutions in a way that encourages some types of interest 
group activity while discourages others. At the very least, it would allow us to compare political 
institutions and choose the most suitable one. A noticeable effort in this direction was taken by 
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000). They compare the effects of interest groups in both a 
parliamentary and a presidential regime. Remarkably, a mixed picture emerges. A presidential 
regime is less affected by interest group distortions, but on the other hand, the parliamentary 
regime is better at providing public goods. Without doubt, more such research is needed to settle 
the numerous normative questions. 
As was illustrated in the previous section, a significant part of the puzzle is that we do not 
know how people organize themselves into interest groups. Shedding light on this matter will 
drastically help us understand, not only their effect on policy, but also how to promote or deter 
their formation. It is of utmost importance that this question is answered because otherwise, we 
will never reach a complete understanding of our economic and political systems.   19
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